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Abstract. This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where
the relative price of oil is aected by exogenous supply shocks and a productivity-driven de-
mand shock. When wages are exible, stabilizing core ination is optimal and the nominal
rate rises (falls) in response to a demand (supply) shock. When both prices and wages are
sticky, core ination falls (rises) in response to the demand (supply) shock. Stabilizing CPI
ination generates small welfare losses only if the demand shock is the main driver of oil
prices. Based on a VAR estimated using post-1986 data for the U.S., both shocks have had
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ation. The federal funds rate rises in response to the demand
shock but falls in response to the supply shock, consistent with the predictions of the theo-
retical model for a policy that stabilizes core ination.
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A long tradition in the literature on monetary policy and oil prices has been to assume that
the relative price of oil is exogenous to the model being considered.
1 One of the motivations
for this setup was the view that exogenous supply shocks, particularly due to OPEC, were
the fundamental driver of oil prices. Kilian (2009), however, has provided evidence that
demand shocks are also important in determining the price of oil, and that macroeconomic
aggregates may respond dierently to these shocks even though they also cause the price of
oil to increase.
This raises an interesting question about whether or not monetary policy should respond
dierently to a rise in the price of oil driven by demand rather than supply. One way to
answer this question is to solve for an optimal monetary policy and examine the impulse
response functions of interest rates and ination variables to see if they dier in important
ways in response to supply and demand shocks. The approach taken in this paper is to
consider the optimal responses that come from a welfare maximizing policy done from the
timeless perspective with a non-distorted steady state.
For this type of optimal policy, Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) showed that when
wages and prices are sticky an exogenous supply shock brings about a rise in core ination
and a decrease in nominal wage ination. The supply shock reduces the marginal product of
labor so the real wage should fall, and higher core ination helps bring about this adjustment.
Echoing the results provided in Aoki (2001), there is no explicit attempt to stabilize the price
of oil because it is a exible price. As such, there is no distortion associated with changes
in that price and, therefore, no reason to stabilize the ination rate of that price. As a
consequence, there is also no explicit attempt to stabilize CPI ination.
In this paper, I show that there are fundamental dierences in the optimal responses when
the increase in the price of oil is due to a productivity-driven demand shock instead of a
supply shock. While core ination initially rises in response to an exogenous oil supply shock,
it falls in response to the demand shock. Even though the productivity shock drives up the
price of oil, on net it increases the marginal product of labor, the opposite of what occurs
with the supply shock. This calls for core ination to decrease so as to help push the real
wage up.
1Examples of this approach include Leduc and Sill (2004), Dhawan and Jeske (2007), Blanchard and Gali
(2010), and the previous version of this paper, Plante (2009). Further examples of the exogenous price
assumption can be found in literature that explores how oil prices aect the macroeconomy, including, but
not limited to, Finn (2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Kim and Loungani (1992). Some recent
work has begun to model endogenous oil prices, including Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008), Nakov
and Pescatori (2010).
2Some important dierences remain even in the simpler case when wages are exible. While
core ination is perfectly stabilized regardless of the shock, the nominal interest rate adjusts
quite dierently. In response to the demand shock the rate rises, but it falls in response to
the exogenous supply shock.
The welfare implications of some alternative policy rules that stabilize core ination, CPI
ination, or nominal wage ination are also examined. Policy rules that stabilize core or
nominal wage ination produce relatively minor welfare losses in all of the cases considered,
so long as the response to ination is not too weak. The costs of stabilizing CPI ination,
however, depend upon the relative importance of supply and demand shocks. When pro-
ductivity shocks are the sole driver of oil prices, stabilizing CPI ination performs relatively
well. When exogenous oil supply shocks drive the relative price of oil, however, this policy
produces high losses compared to stabilizing core ination or nominal wage ination.
The nal contribution of this paper is to take the model's predictions about monetary
policy to the data using a modied version of the VAR introduced in Kilian (2009). The
modied model can identify exogenous oil supply shocks, demand shocks driven by global
economic activity, and a demand shock driven by unexpectedly strong economic activity in
the United States. Data from the post-1986 era is used to estimate the model.
Impulse response functions from the VAR show minimal movements in core ination in
response to both the exogenous supply shock and the shock to U.S. real GDP. An oil supply
shock causes a rise in core ination of about 10 basis points in the rst month. In response to
the demand shock, core ination initially falls by a trivial amount. But, the initial responses
and the ones following that are not statistically dierent from 0 for either shock.
The federal funds rate adjusts dierently in response to the two shocks. The month to
month changes are small, but the cumulative impacts show the federal funds rate falling in
response to the exogenous supply shock but increasing in response to the demand shock.
These results are similar to the ndings in Kilian and Lewis (2011), which showed that
the federal funds rate had a tendency to fall in response to a supply shock and increase in
response to a demand shock driven by global economic activity.
Interestingly, the movement in the funds rate is qualitatively similar to the response the
theoretical model predicts should occur when the central bank stabilizes core ination. This
nding suggests that monetary policy has eectively distinguished between dierent shocks
that aect the price of oil and successfully stabilized core ination. While this may not be
the fully optimal policy in response to both shocks, the losses predicted by the theoretical
model under this policy are relatively small in nature.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the model. Section
three presents the results about the optimal policy and the policy rules. Empirical results
are presented in section four. Section ve concludes.
2. The Model
The model used is a New Keynesian model modied to incorporate rm and household
demand for oil, capital accumulation, and an exogenous oil supply. The following exposition
introduces those equations necessary for understanding the special features of the model or
the results presented in later sections. All other equations and derivations are relegated to
the technical appendix.
2.1. Production. There is a continuum of rms of measure 1 in the intermediate goods
sector, with rms being indexed by i. Each rm produces a specic good, denoted by yit,
which is sold at price pit. The nal good, Yt, is produced using the intermediate goods under
the standard assumptions. The elasticity of substitution between the various intermediate
goods is given by , with  > 1.
In this model the price of the nal good, Pt, is also the price of the nal, non-oil con-






The nal good is the numeraire so all nominal variables are deated by Pt and these are
referred to as real variables.
In the intermediate goods sector, each rm i uses capital, kit, an aggregated labor input,
hit, and oil, o
f
it to produce yit. The real prices of capital, labor, and oil are denoted as Rt,
Wt, and P o
















where  is the elasticity of substitution between the inputs, A a scaling parameter, and a1, a2,
and a3 are distribution parameters. The variable zt is a temporary productivity shock. The
rst order conditions for the inputs come from solving the usual cost-minimization problem.
























4The assumption that there is no factor specicity at the rm level implies that the unit cost
function is taken as given by rms in the intermediate goods sector.
Price setting follows Calvo (1983) in that only a set fraction of rms change their prices
each period, with the probability of a price remaining xed given by !. Firms that are able
























where  is the discount factor of the representative household and t is equal to the marginal
utility of aggregate consumption. In line with Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008), I
assume the existence of a subsidy, p, which removes the distortion due to monopolistic
competition in the steady state.
2.2. The Labor Input. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) the labor input hit is
an aggregate of a continuum of labor types indexed by j. The labor types are imperfect
substitutes for each other with the elasticity of substitution given by n > 1. Demand by
rm i for labor type j is denoted as h
j
it. The setup for producing hit from h
j
it is analogous




























Pt is just the real wage of labor type j. The variable Wt is an aggregate real

















As with prices, only a set fraction of nominal wages change each period, with !n being the
probability of a wage being xed in the current period. A rst order condition for the reset
wages comes directly from the agent's optimization problem. As the job types are ex-ante
identical, all wages reset in the same period are equal in equilibrium. The optimal real wage



















Note that the unchanged wages are deated by core ination because they are in real terms,
not nominal, and over time the real wage may rise or fall depending on what happens with
core ination.
2.3. Aggregation. Aggregation is done linearly across rms and labor types. This in-
troduces two state variables, t and w
t , which measure price and real wage dispersion,






















These variables are important because price and wage dispersion bring about deadweight
losses through the inecient use of the various goods and labor types. Optimal policy will,
therefore, focus on minimizing these distortions in order to reduce the welfare losses they
generate. This implies that there will be an emphasis on stabilizing core and/or nominal
wage ination in response to shocks.
2.4. The Household. Utility from the nal, non-oil consumption good, Ct, and from oil
products, Oh












where  is the elasticity of substitution between non-oil and oil consumption and 2 is a



































tdj is aggregate labor supplied by the agent.
6For convenience, I re-write per period utility in terms of real aggregate consumption
expenditure, Xt = Ct +P o
t Oh
t . This can be done by setting up the indirect utility version of


















t term is simply the CPI, ~ P CPI
t , deated by Pt. As the aggregator is CES the exact




























As expected, CPI ination consists of a core ination component as well as a term that
represents, in a slightly complicated manner, changes in the relative price of oil. This is












where o is the weight of oil products in the Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
In addition to a short-term nominal bond, I assume the existence of two other bonds:
a real bond indexed to the core CPI and a real bond indexed to the CPI. The rst-order
conditions for these bonds provide the equations that link up the nominal interest rate with
the two real interest rates. These bonds are in net-zero supply and do not aect the results,
but their rst-order conditions will be necessary to discuss the results in sections 3 and 4.
The agent's budget constraint is




































As in Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008), I assume the existence of a subsidy, 1 + w,
which removes the distortion in the steady state due to monopolistic competition in labor
markets.
2This is done for expositional purposes only and has no impact on the results. Nor does the fact that the
non-oil consumption good is the numeraire.
7In the budget constraint Bt is real holdings of the nominal bond, It 1 is the nominal
return on that bond, Ik
t is aggregate investment spending on capital goods,  t is aggregated
real prots, T is lump sum transfers, and It 1 is the nominal return on the bond. Holdings
of the bond indexed to core ination are denoted as BCORE
t and its real return denoted as
RCORE
t . The bond indexed to the CPI is denoted as BCPI
t and its real return is denoted as
RCPI
t . Note that since the numeraire is the non-oil consumption good, there is a P CPI
t term
multiplying holdings of the CPI-indexed bond.3
The law of motion for capital is given by
Kt+1   Kt = I
k
t   kKt: (11)
2.5. Interest Rates on Bonds in the Model. The fact that the relative price of the
two consumption goods is not necessarily equal to 1 implies there are two ways to index
bonds to ination in the model, and hence two dierent real interest rates. One is linked
to core ination and the other linked to CPI ination. This is dierent from the basic New
Keynesian model, where there is simply one real interest rate linked to the price of the nal
good.
In the standard New Keynesian model with log preferences ( = 1), the log-linearized rst
order conditions for consumption, Ct, the nominal bond, and a real bond indexed to Pt are
given by
  ^ Ct = ^ t;
^ It = ^ t   Et^ t+1 + Et^ t+1;
^ R
CORE
t = ^ t   Et^ t+1
where t is the multiplier on the household's budget constraint, equal to the marginal utility
of consumption. Variables in hats are log-deviations of variables from their steady state
values. The rst order condition for the nominal bond and the real bond can be combined
to provide the usual (log-linearized) Fisher equation which says that deviations in the nom-
inal interest rate are equal to deviations in the real interest rate and expected ination.
Deviations in the real interest rate are driven by the growth rate of consumption.
For the model used here, assuming log preferences for simplicity, the rst order conditions
for aggregate consumption expenditure, the nominal bond, the bond indexed to the core
3The technical appendix describes how to go from the nominal budget constraint to the real budget constraint,
denominated in terms of the nal good / non-oil consumption good.
8CPI, and the bond indexed to the CPI are, respectively,
X
 1















The log-linearized versions of these equations are
  ^ Xt = ^ t;
^ It = ^ t   Et^ t+1 + Et^ t+1;
^ R
CORE
t = ^ t   Et^ t+1;
^ R
CPI
t = ^ t   Et^ t+1 + Et






As in the standard model, the rst order condition for the nominal bond and the bond
linked to the core CPI can be combined again to give the usual log-linearized Fisher equation,
^ It = ^ R
CORE
t + Et^ t+1: (16)
There is also a Fisher equation linking up the nominal interest rate and the real return on
the bond indexed to the CPI,
^ It = ^ R
CPI
t + Et^ 
CPI
t+1 : (17)
Equations (16) and (17) imply that the model is still Wicksellian in that stabilizing in-
ation requires the nominal interest rate to track the real rate. But, the particular real
interest rate that needs to be tracked depends upon the ination rate being stabilized. If
core ination is being stabilized then the nominal interest rate should track RCORE
t , whereas
if CPI ination is being stabilized then the nominal interest rate should track RCPI
t .
One important dierence between the model in this paper and the basic model is that it is
not the growth rate of consumption itself which drives RCORE
t but instead the growth rate in
aggregate consumption denominated in terms of the non-oil consumption good. The growth
rate of the aggregate consumption basket, denominated in terms of the CPI, is linked to RCPI
t .
This suggests that intuition about consumption smoothing and the behavior it implies for
the real interest rate should apply to RCPI
t but may not apply to RCORE
t . The importance
of this will become clearer in section 3.
92.6. Oil Supply. The supply of oil is given by an exogenous process,
lnO
s







t is a mean zero, i.i.d. shock with a standard deviation of o. The assumption of an
exogenous supply of oil follows Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008). Unlike that model,
there is just a temporary shock to the supply instead of a temporary and a (near) permanent
component.








2.7. Monetary Policy. Monetary policy is given by the Ramsey optimal solution or by a
simple Taylor-type rule. The Ramsey problem maximizes the expected sum of discounted
utility subject to all of the equilibrium equations in the model, such as the agent's rst order
conditions, the resource constraint, and the law of motions for the exogenous processes. The
optimal policy is done under full commitment from the timeless perspective. This problem
produces its own set of rst order conditions which, along with the original equilibrium
conditions, provide a set of non-linear equations that can then be solved using standard
techniques.
For cases where the Ramsey solution is not used, monetary policy follows a simple Taylor








where the parameters I, and  are the steady state values of the nominal interest rate and
core ination, respectively. Rules that replace t with w
t or CPI
t are also considered.
As shown in the previous version of this paper, there was an inverse relationship between
the volatility of the variable in the rule and the calibration of . This continues to hold
in the model used here. Consequently, these policy rules can be considered as alternative
policies that focus on stabilizing the particular ination variable in the rule.
2.8. Calculation of the Welfare Losses and Solution Method. Welfare losses are
calculated as the amount of aggregate real consumption required to produce the same welfare
in a model with sub-optimal policy as the Ramsey optimal policy. To make this clearer, dene















































10As shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) it is possible to derive an equation for c. In
order to be able to distinguish the welfare implications of dierent policies it is necessary to
solve a second order approximation of the model. I use the method of Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) and the code written by the authors in conjunction with that paper to solve
the model. Further details can be found in that paper.
2.9. Calibration. The model is calibrated to an initial steady state using a calibration that
follows Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) in most regards. Table 1 shows the values
for the model's parameters. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, ,
and the elasticity of substitution between various labor types, n, are both set to 6. Both the
probability of a price and a wage being xed in any given period, ! and !n, are set to :75. Log
preferences are used so  is set to 1. The steady state ination rate is the Ramsey optimal
steady state ination rate. As this paper abstracts from money demand the the optimal
steady state gross ination rate is 1. Real GDP is calibrated to unity and steady state real
aggregate consumption expenditure, investment spending, household demand for oil, and
rm demand for oil are set as percentage shares of GDP. Household and rm demand for
oil products are set to 5 percent of GDP and 2 percent of GDP, respectively. These roughly
match the averages found in NIPA data for energy usage by rms and households from 1987
to 2008.
The one signicant departure in the calibration is the elasticity of substitution parameters,
 and . In Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2008) these are set to 1. Here, the elasticity
of substitution between Ct and Oh
t , , is set to :25. This makes Ct and Oh
t Edgeworth
compliments and ensures that the price elasticity of demand for oil products is fairly low.
The elasticity of substitution in production, , is calibrated to set the compensated price
elasticity of demand for oil. Empirical studies tend to nd fairly small sizes, in absolute
terms, for both this elasticity and other closely related elasticities. I calibrate the value of
 to .25 which sets the own price elasticity of oil to about  :25. The motivation for these
choices comes from the calibration of the shock processes.
The law of motion for the technology shock is




t is an i.i.d white noise shocks with standard deviation z. The parameters for the
oil supply process also need to be calibrated. The parameters z and o are set to .80. The
standard deviations of the shocks are set so that volatility of real GDP and the relative
11price of oil in the model match that found in U.S. data from 1987 to the present.4 For the
model with sticky wages and prices, this led to a calibration of o to .003545 and z to .0175.
Without low price elasticities of demand these volatilities would have to unrealistically large
to generate sucient volatility in the price of oil.
3. Theoretical Results
This section presents results for the optimal policy and the policy rules for the cases where
only prices are sticky and where both wages and prices are sticky. Comparing the results
from the two provides strong intuition about what drives the optimal policy in a very general
manner. It also gives a broader set of theoretical results to take to the data.
3.1. Optimal Policy with Flexible Wages. It is well known that when sticky prices are
the only distortion that there is no tradeo between stabilizing ination and the output gap.
It has also been shown that a policy that fully stabilizes ination makes the equilibrium
nominal interest rate change one-for-one with changes in the real interest rate.5
These results also hold in the model used here. As discussed in Bodenstein, Erceg, and
Guerrieri (2008), and presented in a more general form in Aoki (2001), the inclusion of the
oil sector does not add any distortions to this model since the price of that good is exible.
Since this price is exible there is no reason to stabilize its ination rate. This holds true
regardless if supply or demand shocks are driving the price of oil. The analysis, however, is
complicated by the fact that there are multiple ination rates that could be stabilized and
multiple real interest rates in the model.
Since wages are exible, the relevant ination variable to be stabilized is core ination.
This is because deviations in core ination from its target level generate price dispersion,
which will lead to welfare losses. As policy is done from the timeless perspective, core
ination is stabilized perfectly in response to all shocks.
Given that the optimal policy stabilizes core ination, from equation (16) we can see that
the relevant real interest rate that needs to be tracked is RCORE
t , not RCPI
t . In equilibrium,
therefore, the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate will be given by
^ It = ^ R
CORE
t :
4The model is simulated and the simulated data is then logged and HP ltered. A dierent method would
lead to dierent calibrations for the volatilities but changing the volatilities does not impact the qualitative
features of the impulse response functions.
5See Woodford (2003) and the numerous references therein for more discussion on this feature of the model.
12The interesting question is whether or not RCORE
t responds dierently to supply and
demand shocks. Figure 1, which plots the responses of the nominal interest rate and the two
real interest rates to a negative oil supply shock and a positive productivity shock, shows
that this is indeed the case. The top panel shows the deviations of It, the middle panel
RCORE
t , and the bottom panel RCPI
t . The shocks are one-standard deviation in size. The
responses have been annualized.
In response to a negative supply shock, the nominal interest rate is initially lowered and
remains below average for around two years. But, in response to the productivity shock the
rate is increased and remains above average for almost two years.
The movement in the nominal rate is being driven by the response of RCORE
t . To see what
drives RCORE






where Xt = Ct+P oOh
t . This variable measures aggregate consumption expenditure, in terms
of the non-oil good. In response to a negative oil supply shock, Xt initially rises and then
falls overtime. This occurs because oil is demanded inelastically by the household, so that
spending by households, denominated in terms of the non-oil consumption good, rises.6 As
such, the multiplier falls initially and then rises over time, bringing about the behavior of
RCORE seen in gure 1.
This may seem at odds with the usual intuition that the agent would want to smooth
consumption over time in response to a shock like the supply shock. Such smoothing should
cause the real interest rate to increase. But, the key point to remember is that the interest
rate linked to the overall consumption basket is given by RCPI
t , not RCORE
t . As shown in
gure 1, RCPI
t rises in response to both shocks, as expected.
3.2. Policy Rules with Flexible Wages. Given that stabilizing core ination is the opti-
mal policy, how costly would it be to pursue a dierent policy, say of stabilizing CPI ination,
and would the results dier signicantly if one shock or the other was more important in
driving oil prices?
To answer these questions, the welfare losses for the three simple policy rules introduced
earlier are calculated. This is done for three cases: one where both shocks hit the econ-
omy, one where only oil supply shocks hit the economy (z set to 0), and one where only
productivity shocks hit the economy (o set to 0).
6This does not imply that utility is higher for the household, since utility is given by Xt
P CPI
t .
13Figure 2 plots the losses as a function of . The top panel shows the case with both
shocks, the middle panel the case with only supply shocks, and the bottom panel the case
with only the productivity shock.
Under all three cases, the rules that stabilize core ination or nominal wage ination
produce essentially zero welfare losses, so long as  is away from the lower bound of 1.7
The rule that stabilizes CPI ination, however, only performs well when productivity
shocks are the sole shock to hit the economy. Why is this so? Theoretically speaking,
stabilizing CPI ination always produces welfare losses in this model since this policy forces
the core CPI to adjust in response to movements in the relative price of oil. How large these
losses are, though, depends upon how big the movements in the relative price of oil are.
When productivity shocks are the sole shock in the model, these price movements are
minute because rms use a fairly small amount of oil. Given this, the costs of stabilizing
CPI ination are small. The cost of stabilizing CPI ination, however, would rise if the
productivity shocks were more volatile, or if the rms used more oil to produce goods and
services.
3.3. Optimal Policy with Sticky Wages. As shown in Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri
(2008), sticky wages introduce a tradeo between stabilizing ination and the output gap in
this model. This tradeo exists because a shock which aects the marginal product of labor
requires the real wage to adjust. When wages are exible, it is costless to have nominal
wages adjust to ensure the real wage is at its optimal level. With sticky wages, however,
nominal wage movements generate their own welfare losses. These losses can be mitigated,
partially, through movements in core ination. For example, any shock which requires the
real wage to fall optimally brings about a rise in core ination.
Figure 3 shows the importance of this for the case of an oil supply shock. The black line
is for the case with exible wages while the dashed line is for the case with sticky wages.
When wages are exible, there is a sharp drop in wage ination in the initial period of the
shock and no movement in core ination. As predicted, with sticky wages core ination rises
and there is a more muted response in nominal wage ination.
An important nding in this paper is that the response to the productivity-driven demand
shock is not the same as the response to the supply shock. This can be seen in gure 4, where
the top panel plots the response of core ination to the two shocks while the bottom panel
7In a previous version of this paper, Plante (2009), I showed that the volatility of the ination variable
(around its target value) in the rule is inversely related to the value of , with the volatility becoming
essentially zero for larger values of . This holds in this model, as well, and explains why values of 
closer to 1 cause larger welfare losses.
14plots nominal wage ination. Core ination immediately rises in response to the supply
shock, while in response to the demand shock it falls. Similarly, the immediate impact of
wage ination to the supply shock is down, but for the demand shock it is up.
The dierence is because of the opposite impact the two shocks have on the marginal
product of labor, which determines the optimal response of the real wage and core ination.
An exogenous supply shock reduces the marginal product of labor. This calls for a fall in
the real wage and higher core ination. While the productivity shock raises the price of oil,
its net eect on the marginal product of labor is positive. This makes it optimal for the real
wage to increase in response to the demand shock and then eventually decline over time. In
order to accomplish this, the optimal policy calls for core ination to decrease at rst, and
then eventually rise for some length of time.
3.4. Policy Rules with Sticky Wages. Given that the optimal policy allows for non-zero
core ination when wages are sticky, does this signicantly change which policy rules perform
well? To answer this, I re-calculate the welfare losses generated by the three policy rules and
plot the losses as a function of  in gure 5.
A visual inspection shows that the qualitative results are exactly the same as in gure
2. When supply shocks drive the price of oil, a rule that stabilizes CPI ination performs
poorly. When these shocks are shut down and the demand shock drives oil prices, this rule
performs just as well as the other rules.
The reason for this nding, however, is slightly more nuanced than the previous case.
Under exible wages, stabilizing CPI ination performs poorly because it generates price
dispersion. Under sticky wages, the optimal policy itself generates some price dispersion, so
this explanation may not hold.
Indeed, it turns out that what drives the results is the impact that stabilizing CPI ination
has on the real wage, not on price dispersion. More specically, when oil supply shocks aect
the relative price of oil, stabilizing CPI ination pushes the real wage in the wrong direction.












Under the extreme case where CPI ination is perfectly stabilized at its steady state level,
any rise in the relative price of oil forces the core CPI to adjust down. The catch is that
pushing the core CPI downwards pushes the real wage up, which is the wrong direction in
response to an exogenous oil supply shock. Nominal wages compensate for this by adjusting
more than they would under the optimal policy, leading to unnecessary welfare losses. The
15stickier wages are relative to prices, the worse this policy will fare when supply shocks are
the main driver of oil prices.
Pushing the real wage up, however, is the correct choice when productivity shocks are the
sole driver of oil prices. In that case, rising oil prices require rising real wages. Consequently,
if productivity shocks drive the price of oil then a policy rule which stabilizes CPI ination
performs just as well as the other two rules.
3.5. Sensitivity Analysis. In this section I conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering
two special cases of the model. In the rst, household demand for oil products is shut down
so as to highlight the role that rm demand has on the optimal policy. This is followed by a
scenario where rm demand for oil is shut down so as to shed light on the role of household
demand on the optimal policy. All results are for the model with sticky wages and sticky
prices, and for brevity's sake the impulse response functions are omitted.8
3.5.1. No Household Demand. Compared to the baseline model, the optimal policy results
are qualitatively similar when household demand for oil is abstracted from. As before, the
eect of both shocks on the marginal product of labor is in the opposite direction. The
oil supply shock drives up the relative price of oil, essentially reducing the demand for
labor by rms. The productivity shock, on the other hand, increases the demand for labor.
Consequently, in response to the supply shock core ination rises and wage ination falls
while a demand shock causes the opposite to occur.
3.5.2. No Firm Demand. The results for the productivity shock are the same with or without
rm demand for oil, as it increases the marginal product of labor. Therefore core ination
falls and wage ination rises.
An oil supply shock now impacts the marginal product of labor entirely through the
decisions of the household, and these are driven by whether or not oil and the non-oil
consumption good are complements or substitutes. It can be shown that the two goods are
Edgeworth complements when  > c and substitutes when  < c. The baseline calibration
therefore leads them to be complements, as  is equal to 1 and c equal to 0.25.
For the baseline calibration, an oil supply shock leads to the opposite responses in core
ination and wage ination compared to the model with both household and rm demand.
The supply shock forces consumption of the oil good to fall. Since the two goods are com-
plements, non-oil consumption must also fall. In equilibrium, this implies a fall in the
production of the nal good and, consequently, a fall in the equilibrium quantity of labor.
8The impulse response functions are available upon request. Results for the model with exible wages or for
other experiments are also available upon request.
16The optimal way to do this is to push up the real wage, which can be accomplished through
a drop in core ination. In an alternative calibration where  is 1 and c is 1.25, so that
the two consumptions goods are substitutes, the results are the opposite with core ination
rising and nominal wage ination falling.
4. Empirical Results
The theoretical model makes predictions about the responses of several policy relevant
variables, including the nominal interest rate and the rate of ination. To summarize, when
wages are exible core ination is stabilized at its target value and the nominal interest rate
falls in response to an exogenous supply shock but rises in response to a demand shock.
With sticky wages, core ination rises in response to an exogenous supply shock but falls in
response to the productivity shock.
An interesting question to ask is to what extent these predictions might be found in the
data. This has been considered, indirectly, in two recent and important papers. Kilian
(2009) introduced an empirical model that allows one to identify an exogenous oil supply
shock, a global demand shock (essentially a demand shock for all commodities driven by
global economic activity), and an oil specic-demand shock. An extension of this model,
which incorporated the federal funds rate as a fourth variable, was used in Kilian and Lewis
(2011). There are many interesting ndings in both publications but here I focus on those
results specically related to the federal funds rate and the rate of ination.
The ndings of these papers was that the federal funds rate responds dierently depending
upon the underlying shock driving the price of oil. The federal funds rate has a tendency to
fall when a supply shock hits, while a demand shock driven by global economic activity or
by some oil specic-demand shock causes the federal funds rate to rise. It was also shown
that the CPI was more aected by the demand shocks, because they appeared to have more
persistent aects on the price of oil than the supply shocks.
Several interesting questions, however, remain unaddressed. First, there are no results for
how core ination responds to the dierent shocks. This is important because, in theory, it
is the behavior of core ination that is relevant for discussing optimal policy. Second, the
empirical results do not, by themselves, provide an explanation for the dierent responses
seen in the federal funds rate. The theoretical model might provide a coherent story about
the empirical results. Finally, there is a question about whether or not the Federal Reserve
responds dierently if the demand shock originates from unexpectedly strong economic ac-
tivity in the U.S. as opposed to a globally driven demand shock.
17To address these issues, I modify the empirical model rst developed in Kilian (2009),
and later used in Kilian and Lewis (2011). In what follows, the main points of the original
VAR are summarized, followed by a discussion of the modications made to the model and
the reasons for the modications. The impulse response functions from this model are then
examined and discussed in light of the results from the theoretical model.
4.1. The Original Model. The VAR used in Kilian (2009) is written in the following form,
A0zt =  +
24 X
i=1
Aizt i + t: (22)
The data is monthly, from 1973:1 to 2007:12, and given by zt = (prodt;reat;rpot)0 where
prodt is the monthly percentage change in world oil production, reat is a measure of
global economic activity constructed by Kilian, and rpot is the rener's acquisition cost of
oil deated by the CPI. The data for world oil production comes from the Department of
Energy and measures production in thousands of barrels per day. In Kilian and Lewis (2011)
this model was extended by adding the federal funds rate (dierenced) as a fourth variable
in the system.







A Cholesky decomposition is used to back out the structural shocks using the residuals.
The variables are ordered as listed in zt. This implies that world oil production responds to
both demand shocks with a one-month lag, and that world economic activity responds to oil
specic-demand shocks with a lag.
The assumption that the oil supply responds with a lag is grounded in the fact that
changing production levels in the oil industry is very dicult to do within a one month
window. Kilian (2009) argues that the assumption that economic activity responds with a
lag to the oil-specic demand shock is justied due the sluggish response of economic activity
seen in the data to changes in oil prices, in general. Note that this ordering also implies that
oil prices can respond in one months time to the other shocks, a quite reasonable assumption.
4.2. The Modied Model. Any attempt to match up the predictions of the theoretical
model with the data needs to take into account that the global demand shock in the original
empirical model does not directly map into the demand shock in theoretical model. Taking
this into account is important for at least three reasons. First, a demand shock originating
18in the United States need not always be associated with a demand shock driven by global
economic activity. Second, it would be a strong assumption to claim a priori that the
Federal Reserve responds equivalently to those two demand shocks. Finally, any demand
shock originating in the U.S. which, for whatever reason, is orthogonal to the global demand
shock would, in the original empirical model, get shued into the oil-specic demand shock.
My solution is to modify the model in several ways which should allow for a better match
between the empirical model and the theoretical model.
Let zt = (prodt;reat;lrgdpt;rpot;FFt;core
t )0, where prodt is the monthly per-
centage change in world oil production, reat is Kilian's measure of global economic activity,
lrgdpt is the log of Stock and Watson's monthly real GDP for the U.S., rst dierenced,
rpot is the log of the rener acquisition cost of oil deated by the core CPI, rst dierenced,
FFt is the monthly change in the eective Federal Funds rate, and core
t is the ination
rate of the CPI excluding energy prices.9
The model is estimated with monthly data spanning from 1987:1 to 2008:6. This sample
is chosen for two reasons. First, there was a change in US monetary policy in the early
1980s. Second, there were also important changes in the oil market in the mid-1980s, with
one example being the collapse of OPEC. Starting in 1987 avoids having to deal with the
potential problems that might occur if there are signicant breaks in the data generating
process due to one or both of those issues. Data from the recent crisis is excluded given the
atypical monetary policy that has been in place since then.
The form of the VAR is given by
A0zt =  +
5 X
i=1
Aizt i + t: (23)
Only 5 lags are included instead of the original 24. This is done for two reasons. First, the
sample is smaller while the number of variables included larger, so there are fewer degrees
of freedom available. Second, the LR test and the AIC test picked an optimal lag length
of 5 lags while the Schwartz criterion chose 1 lag as optimal. In the interest of capturing
a richer set of dynamics, 5 lags were chosen. Data from the end of 1986 is used in the
estimation process so useable observations run from 1987:1 to 2008:6, leading to a total of
258 observations.
9The model was also estimated using Stock and Watson's measure of monthly real GDI, logged and rst
dierenced, instead of real GDP. The responses were similar in both cases. As an additional check the
model was also estimated using the monthly GDP series from Macroeconomic Advisers, available starting in
1992:04. The error bands were wider in this case due to the smaller sample, but qualitatively the responses
of core ination and the federal funds rate remained similar.











shock to core ination
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A Cholesky decomposition, where the variables are ordered in the same way as they are
found in zt, is used to identify the structural shocks.
The justication for the ordering of the rst two variables follows from the arguments
given in Kilian (2009). Ordering U.S. real GDP after global economic activity is done for
two reasons. First, this allows economic activity in the U.S. to endogenously respond to
shocks that aect the world economy, which by denition should include the U.S. It also
ensures that the structural shock to U.S. real GDP is due to unexpectedly higher activity
originating in the U.S., and not simply a spill over from world economic activity. Second, this
ordering ensures that a demand shock due to U.S. economic activity does not get shued
into the oil specic-demand shock.
With oil prices ordered after the economic activity variables, the shock to the price of
oil can again be interpreted as an oil specic-demand shock, as in Kilian (2009). The one
dierence is that U.S. specic-demand shocks are specically parceled out of this. The two
other shocks in the model are unimportant for the results of this paper and not discussed
further. The results presented are insensitive to the ordering of the federal funds rate or core
ination.
4.3. Results. The impulse response functions for the oil supply shock and U.S. demand
shock are shown in gures 6 - 9.10 The responses are plotted over a 24 month period. In
all of the graphs the solid line is the point estimate, the dashed lines the one-standard error
bands, and the dots are the two-standard error bands. A response is dened as marginally
signicant if 0 is outside of the one-standard error band and signicant if 0 is outside of the
two-standard error band.
Figure 6 shows the responses due to a one-standard deviation shock to the supply of oil.
The unexpected decrease in the supply of oil causes several months of rising oil prices. Core
ination initially rises, on an annualized basis, by about 10 basis points. This movement,
10Results for the other shocks are available upon request.
20however, is just marginally signicant and all other other movements after it are not statisti-
cally dierent from 0. While the federal funds rate declines, this movement is only signicant
starting about 5 months after the shock.
Some of the responses are choppy and the month to month movements can mask the
longer run implications of the responses. Figure 7, therefore, plots the cumulative responses
of the variables to the supply shock. From this viewpoint, there is a marginally signicant
reduction in economic activity in the U.S. due to higher oil prices, similar to the ndings
in Kilian (2009). The cumulative impact on core ination is essentially 0. In gure 6, the
federal funds rate declined over a number of months. The cumulative eect of these declines
is a reduction in the rate that is marginally signicant after 5 months, and very close to
being signicant over the course of two years.
Figure 8 plots the responses to a positive shock to U.S. real GDP growth. Unexpectedly
strong growth in the U.S. brings about several rounds of increases in the real price of oil,
which are marginally signicant in the rst two months. While the point estimate of core
ination shows some variation, none of the movements are statistically signicant at any
horizon. The response of the federal funds rate to this shock is very dierent from the
exogenous oil supply shock. Instead of falling, there are a series of small increases over time,
some of which are statistically signicant.
As with the supply shock, looking at the cumulative responses gives a better view of what
happens over time. Two results are statistically signicant: the increases in the federal
funds rate and the higher growth in real GDP. The cumulative impact on the price of oil
is upwards, and this is marginally signicant. The response of core ination, while positive
according to the point estimate, is not statistically dierent from 0 at any point in time.
Quantitatively, the impulse response functions for core ination are similar but there
are very dierent responses in the federal funds rate. Can the theoretical model provide
a reasonable story for these results? In the case of the demand shock, the answer is very
much yes. In response to the demand shock, the federal funds rate rises over time while
core ination shows no statistically signicant movements. This is exactly what the model
predicts should happen when monetary policy stabilizes core ination in response to this
type of shock.11
Analyzing the supply shock is slightly more dicult. There is an initial rise in core
ination, although this is barely signicant. This is the response that would be optimal
if one believes wages need to be adjusted downwards through higher core ination. But,
11The responses in gure 1 are from the model with exible wages. The responses from the model with sticky
wages are qualitatively quite similar when core ination is stabilized. The nominal rate rises in response to
the demand shock but is lowered in response to the supply shock.
21all movements in core ination after the initial rise are not signicantly dierent from 0.
Furthermore, the federal funds rate is, cumulatively, lower over the rst two years. The
story behind these responses would be generally consistent with what the theoretical model
says monetary policy should do to stabilize core ination.
Taken together then, after 1986 the Federal Reserve seems to have placed a strong emphasis
on stabilizing core ination in response to both oil supply shocks and a demand shock that
is driven by unexpectedly strong economic activity in the U.S. Movements in the federal
funds rate show that the Federal Reserve has responded dierently in response to the two
dierent shocks. This is despite the fact that both drive up the price of oil, and therefore
might naively be lumped together as an oil price shock.
There is one nal issue regarding the empirical results worth addressing. Given the large
degree of wage and price stickiness often found at an aggregate level, stabilizing core ination
in response to these two shocks is technically sub-optimal. Is this something to be concerned
about? The results from gure 5 show that this policy is fairly innocuous in welfare terms.
Even with sticky wages and prices, a policy rule that stabilized core ination would produce
trivial losses for values of  that have been found in the literature for U.S. monetary policy
after 1986.
5. Conclusions
This paper has examined optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model where the
relative price of oil is driven by both an exogenous supply shock and a productivity-driven
demand shock. When wages are exible, the optimal policy keeps core ination on target
regardless of which shock drives oil prices. The nominal interest rate falls in response to the
supply shock and rises in response to the demand shock.
When there is a tradeo between stabilizing ination and output, there are important
qualitative dierences in the response of core ination. This variable initially rises in response
to the supply shock but falls in response to the demand shock. This occurs because the supply
shock reduces the marginal product of labor while the productivity shock, while raising the
price of oil, on net raises the marginal product of labor. The optimal policy, since it uses
variations in core ination to aect the real wage, consequently generates higher ination in
response to the supply shock but lower ination in response to the demand shock.
These predictions are taken to the data using a VAR that that can identify exogenous oil
supply shocks and a demand shock driven by unexpectedly strong economic activity in the
U.S. The impulse response functions show that the federal funds rate responds quite dierent
in response to the two dierent shocks. The federal funds rate is lowered in response to the
22supply shock while in response to the demand shock it is increased. In response to both
shocks core ination responds minimally. There is some statistical evidence that it rises by
a small amount over the rst month or two when there is an oil supply shock. But there
is no statistically signicant movement in core ination in response to the demand shock.
The behavior of the federal funds rate and core ination is close to what the theoretical
model predicts should happen if the Federal Reserve is attempting to stabilize core ination
in response to the two shocks.
The ndings of this paper provide further evidence of the importance of distinguishing
between the source of the shock that aects the price of oil. With this in mind, one obvious
shortcoming of the present paper is that the model is essentially a closed economy model. As
such, it is useful for thinking about a certain sub-set of the shocks that could jointly aect
the U.S. economy and the price of oil. Clearly a useful avenue for future research would
be to construct a multi-country model where the implications of global demand shocks and
demand shocks originating in other foreign countries on U.S. monetary policy could be
explored. Given the size of this undertaking, though, this is left for future research.
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24Figure 1. Optimal responses of nominal and real interest rates (exible wages)
25Figure 2. Welfare losses for dierent rules under exible wages: Both shocks
active (top), supply shock active (middle), productivity shock active (bottom).
26Figure 3. Optimal responses to a supply shock under exible and sticky
wages: core ination (top), wage ination (bottom)
27Figure 4. Optimal responses of core ination and wage ination under sticky
wages: oil supply shock (top), productivity shock (bottom)
28Figure 5. Welfare losses for dierent rules under sticky wages: Both shocks
active (top), supply shock active (middle), productivity shock active (bottom).
29Figure 6. Responses to oil supply shock, error bands in dashed black (1 s.e.)
and dots (2 s.e)
30Figure 7. Cumulative responses to negative oil supply shock, error bands in
dashed black (1 s.e.) and dots (2 s.e)
31Figure 8. Responses to US real GDP growth rate shock, error bands in
dashed black (1 s.e.) and dots (2 s.e)
32Figure 9. Cumulative responses to US real GDP growth rate shock, error
bands in dashed black (1 s.e.) and dots (2 s.e)
33Table 1. Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Value
 Discount Factor .993
k Capital Deprecation Rate .01785
! Degree of Price Stickiness .75
!n Degree of Wage Stickiness .75
 Steady State Ination 1
Y g Steady State Real GDP 1
X Aggregate Consumption to GDP Ratio .80
Oh Household Oil to GDP Ratio .05
Of Firm Oil to GDP Ratio .02
Ik Investment Spending to GDP Ratio .20
 Elasticity of Substitution (Intermediate Goods) 6
n Elasticity of Substitution (Labor Types) 6
 Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply 1
 Elasticity of Substitution between C and Oh .25
 Elasticity of Substitution in Production .25
 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1
o AR(1) Coecient of Supply Shock .80
z AR(1) Coecient of Productivity Shock .80
o Standard Deviation of Supply Shock .003545
z Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock .0175
34